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Abstract
The question of whether non-state armed groups could and should provide
reparations to their victims has been largely overlooked. This article explores this
gap, with a particular focus on symbolic reparations, such as acknowledgement of the
truth and apologies. It argues that, while the question is fraught with legal,
conceptual, and practical difﬁculties, there are some circumstances in which armed
groups are capable of providing measures of reparations to their victims. The article
identiﬁes the issue of attacks on informers as one potential area for armed groups to
provide such measures, and demonstrates that in a few cases armed groups have
already engaged in actions that could be seen as analogous to symbolic reparations.
The article’s main case study is provided by recent actions by the Irish Republican
Army (IRA) in relation to its past attacks against suspected informers.
While non-state actors have been involved in violence throughout history, the
inﬂuence of armed groups has been rising exponentially in the last two decades.
Armed groups are present in virtually all major areas of violence: for example, Iraq,
Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan, Lebanon, Gaza, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria,
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chechnya, the fragmented set of
* The author would like to thank Avner Gidron, Kieran McEvoy, and Tomaso Falchetta for helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this article. A grant from The Global Consortium on Security
Transformation (GCST) assisted in conducting the research.
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conﬂicts with Al Qaeda and its afﬁliates, and the recent conﬂict in Libya. Armed
groups have also participated in the recent conﬂicts in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Algeria,
Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland. Non-international armed conﬂicts
involving non-state armed groups are now the dominant form of conﬂict in world
affairs, with inter-state wars becoming the exception.1 At the beginning of 2008
there were twenty-six active armed conﬂicts worldwide, all of them involving armed
groups.2 Thus, ‘by deﬁnition, at least half the belligerents in the most widespread
and most victimizing of armed conﬂicts around the world, i.e. non-international
armed conﬂicts, are non-state armed groups’.3 In addition, many armed groups have
operated and committed abuses in situations of political violence that do not cross
the threshold for being considered as an armed conﬂict under international
humanitarian law (IHL) (for example, the Maoist armed groups in north-east India,
or ETA in Spain).
The rise in importance of armed groups has led to several developments.
First, the legal norms applying to the conduct of armed groups, in particular IHL,
have been gradually articulated and clariﬁed, and indeed have become the subject of
a growing body of literature.4 Perhaps the most important step has been the
clariﬁcation of customary rules of IHL: the majority (though not all) of the 161 rules
governing armed conﬂicts that were authoritatively identiﬁed by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) apply in non-international armed conﬂict and
are thus binding on armed groups.5 The general principle of applying at least some
of the norms of IHL to armed groups is now beyond dispute; the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (SCSL), for example, was able to simply assert that: ‘. . . it is well settled
1 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 2nd edition, Polity Press,
Cambridge, 2006; Richard Schultz and Andrea Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of
Contemporary Combat, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006; UN High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibilities, United Nations, 2004, p. 17.
2 Joseph J. Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr, Peace and Conﬂict 2010, Paradigm
Publishers, Boulder, CO, 2010, p. 27.
3 Marco Sassòli, ‘Taking armed groups seriously: ways to improve their compliance with international
humanitarian law’, in International Humanitarian Legal Studies, Vol. 1, 2010, p. 6.
4 Marco Sassòli, Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law, Harvard University
Program on Humanitarian Law and Policy, Occasional Paper 6, 2006, available at: http://www.
hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/ﬁles/publications/OccasionalPaper6.pdf (last visited 20 January 2012);
Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Binding armed opposition groups’, in International and Comparative Law
Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2006, pp. 369–394; Anne-Marie La Rosa and Caroline Wuerzner, ‘Armed
groups, sanctions and the implementation of international humanitarian law’, in International Review of
the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 870, 2008, pp. 327–341; Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The new wars and the crisis of
compliance with the law of armed conﬂict by non-state actors’, in Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology, Vol. 98, No. 3, 2008, pp. 711–810; Liesbeth Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition
Groups in International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002; Andrew Clapham, ‘Human
rights obligations of non-state actors in conﬂict situation’, in International Review of the Red Cross,
Vol. 88, No. 863, 2006, pp. 491–523; Noelle Higgins, ‘The regulation of armed non-state actors: promoting
the application of the laws of war to conﬂicts involving national liberation movements’, in Human Rights
Brief, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2009, pp. 12–17; M. Sassòli above note 3.
5 See the ICRC database of customary IHL, available at: http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home
(last visited 8 August 2011). See also International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, ‘Report of the
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004’, Geneva, 25 January 2005, para. 166, available at:
http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf (last visited 20 January 2012).
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that all parties to an armed conﬂict, whether states or non-state actors, are bound by
international humanitarian law, even though only states may become parties to
international treaties’.6 While the question of the application of human rights norms
to armed groups is not as settled, there have been several sources claiming such
application, at least in some circumstances.7 In terms of accountability, international
criminal law applies to members of armed groups almost without distinction from
state agents, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has
conﬁrmed that members of armed groups can be held criminally responsible for war
crimes, crimes against humanity (which are deﬁned there as attacks that take place
pursuant to or in furtherance of ‘a State or organizational policy’),8 and genocide.9
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)10 and the
SCSL11 have prosecuted members and leaders of armed groups. The ICC’s ﬁrst
indictment was against a member of an armed group, not against a state leader or
ofﬁcial, and as of April 2011 members of armed groups remain a majority (fourteen
out of twenty-two) of the individuals indicted by the ICC.12
While the increasing ability to hold individual perpetrators to account is
important, in general there is an agreement that international criminal law and
individual prosecutions do not address the full range of the needs of victims.13
Indeed, as will be detailed below, the issue of reparations – including symbolic
reparations – has emerged as a central theme in response to state abuses. However,
the rising attention of scholars and advocates to armed groups has not yet involved
sustained attention to the issue of reparations from armed groups. As Zegveld wrote,
‘while international bodies have given due consideration to the accountability of
individual leaders of armed opposition groups, they have so far largely ignored the
accountability of the groups in favour of the accountability of individual
members’.14 Overlooking of the question of reparations from armed groups is a
major omission, which could leave victims of abuses by armed groups unable to
achieve the redress that they seek.
It is important to emphasize early on that the main reason why the question
of reparations from armed groups has not garnered adequate attention is likely to be
that in most cases it is not feasible to require any type of reparations from armed
6 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary
Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment) (Appeals Chamber), 31 May 2004, para. 22.
7 Jan Arno Hessbruegge, ‘Human rights violations arising from conduct of non-state actors’, in Buffalo
Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 11, 2005, pp. 21–88; A. Clapham, above note 4; Annyssa Bellal, Gilles
Giacca, and Stuart Casey-Maslen, ‘International law and armed non-state actors in Afghanistan’, in
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 881, 2011, pp. 47–79.
8 ICC Rome Statute, Art. 7(2)(a), emphasis added.
9 Ibid., Art. 6, which does not specify that perpetrators must be state ofﬁcials or agents.
10 See e.g. ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj & Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T,
Judgment (Trial Chamber), 3 April 2008.
11 See e.g. SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (RUF Case), Case
No. SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 2009.
12 See ICC, ‘Situations and cases’, available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/
(last visited 8 August 2011).
13 See e.g. Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein, ‘Violence and social repair: rethinking the
contribution of justice to reconciliation’, in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2002, pp. 573–639.
14 L. Zegveld, above note 4, p. 223.
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groups. Armed groups often lack the capacity to provide reparations, and frequently
do also not have the political will to do so. In some cases, armed groups also
disintegrate and cease to exist in the aftermath of conﬂicts. In addition, there is a
dearth of formal mechanisms through which victims can claim such reparations
from armed groups. While a variety of international, regional, and national
mechanisms are available to victims of state abuses who seek to bring a reparation
claim against a state, there are no equivalent mechanisms in relation to armed
groups. For example, victims of armed groups cannot address an armed group
directly through mechanisms such as the European Court of Human Rights or the
United Nations Human Rights Committee, as they can do in relation to states.
However, while it is certainly true that reparations from armed groups will
not be feasible in all cases, it is wrong to assume that they will simply never be
feasible. As will be elaborated below, this article presents the argument that, at least
in some cases, and in relation to at least some forms of reparations, it would indeed
be feasible to discuss the question of reparations from armed groups. This potential
should be explored, analysed, and cultivated, even while accepting the feasibility
hurdles.
The argument should also be viewed in the context of the extraordinary
developments over the last ﬁfteen years or so of international norms and practice in
relation to armed groups. As was mentioned above, during this period the ICRC
customary law study clariﬁed the IHL norms applicable to armed groups; the ICC
has made dramatic steps in terms of individual criminal responsibility of armed
groups’ leaders and members; and innovative mechanisms have emerged in relation
to international monitoring of the conduct of armed groups,15 as well as voluntary
commitments by armed groups on issues such as anti-personnel landmines and the
treatment of children.16 This landscape would probably have seemed unfeasible to
observers in the early 1990s. The question of reparations from armed groups could
become the next frontier in this development curve, and should be assessed
accordingly. Finally, it is important to note that the articulation of norms and the
advocacy for their realization could have important meaning even when the
feasibility of the advocacy can be questioned. Organizations advocating for respect
for human rights and IHL often make recommendations to states in the full
knowledge that the chances of all these recommendations being acted upon are slim,
and it could be that a similar approach might at times be useful in relation to armed
groups.
The remainder of the article will be structured as follows: the next section
explores in greater detail the question of reparations from armed groups, and will
argue that this topic has been thus far overlooked, which could result in a gap in
relation to the right to redress of victims. The following section then identiﬁes
attacks against alleged informers by armed groups as a potentially suitable ‘entry
15 For example, the Ofﬁce of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conﬂict.
16 See for example the work of the non-governmental organization Geneva Call, available at: http://www.
genevacall.org/Themes/themes.htm (last visited 8 August 2011).
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point’ to the issue of symbolic reparations from armed groups, and describes an
early precedent of an armed group providing measures of symbolic reparations in
this context: the African National Congress (ANC) in 1992–1993. Next, the article
turns to focus on actions taken by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the years after
the peace agreement in Northern Ireland in relation to its past attacks on alleged
informers. This section demonstrates that these actions are consistent with many of
the principles regarding symbolic reparations, though neither the IRA nor the ANC
self-described them as ‘symbolic reparations’ or made explicit references to the duty
to provide reparations under international human rights or humanitarian law.
Finally, the implications of the discussion, in particular the potential view of armed
groups as post-conﬂict actors, are explored in the conclusion.
Armed groups and the duty to provide reparations: a blind spot?
Advocacy for the right to reparations of victims of serious human rights abuses
and violations of IHL has become one of the central tenets of transitional justice
and the struggle for accountability for abuses.17 This trend is premised on moving
beyond a narrow focus on attempting to bring perpetrators to justice, and instead is
focused on the victims of abuses, acknowledging their suffering and their needs and
attempting to address the damage done.18
The central source detailing these rights is the Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law (‘Basic Principles’), which were adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly in 2006.19 The Basic Principles were described as ‘an
international bill of rights of victims’.20
A crucial feature of the modern understanding and practice of reparation
is that it involves more than just ﬁnancial compensation to victims. The concept of
reparations refers to a wide range of measures that can be taken in response to
violations and abuses, with the exact appropriate forms depending on context
and circumstances.21 In addition to compensation, the Basic Principles detail
other modalities of reparations: restitution, rehabilitation, guarantees of non-
repetition, and satisfaction. Especially with regard to satisfaction, there have been
17 Pablo De Greiff (ed.), The Handbook of Reparations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006; International
Center for Transitional Justice, Reparations in Theory and Practice, New York, 2007.
18 Jemima Garcia-Godos, ‘Victim reparations in the Peruvian truth commission and the challenge of
historical interpretation’, in International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 2, 2008, p. 65.
19 Adopted by UNGA Res. 60/147, 21 March 2006.
20 Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International recognition of victims’ rights’, inHuman Rights Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 2,
pp. 203–279. Victims’ rights were also formulated in an overlapping UN instrument, ‘The updated set of
principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity’, Report
of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, Diane Orentlicher, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005.
21 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Reparations decisions and dilemmas’, in Hastings International and Comparative
Law Review, Vol. 27, 2004, pp. 157–200; Max Du Plessis and Stephen Pete, Repairing the Past?
International Perspectives on Reparations for Gross Human Rights Abuses, Intersentia, Oxford, 2007.
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developments in theory and practice in relation to what are often referred to as
‘moral reparations’ or ‘symbolic reparations’: various forms of truth-recovery
(including the concept of a right to truth),22 acknowledgment of responsibility,
apologies, and responding to the non-material needs of victims.
The term ‘symbolic’ does not necessarily mean forms of reparations that are
less signiﬁcant – only that they involve a greater intangible element.23 Symbolic
reparations can range from disclosing the truth about past events (for example, in
relation to enforced disappearances), offering ofﬁcial apologies, or restoring the
good name of victims, to commemoration measures such as changing of names
of public spaces or the creation of museums and parks dedicated to the memory of
victims.24 The Basic Principles dedicate signiﬁcant space to elaborating modalities
of symbolic reparations and they have featured in recommendations from truth
commissions and international bodies, most notably the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights.25 In comparison to ﬁnancial compensation, symbolic reparations
‘cater to a broader range of victim concerns, and take seriously their need for
recognition, respect, dignity and hope for a safe future’.26 Measures such as
apologies, commemorations, and tributes, are often seen as more important to the
victim than material ones.27 As one commentator suggests, ‘[c]ommemorations can
ﬁll the vacuum with creative responses and may help heal the rupture not only
internally but also the rupture the victimisation created between the survivors and
their society’.28 The Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has further
observed that
symbolic measures derive their great potential from the fact that they are
carriers of meaning, and therefore can help victims in particular and society in
general to make sense of the painful events of the past [and] allow [victims] to
move on.29
In all its manifestations, reparation has emerged as a key feature of
accountability and transitional justice. It was deﬁned as a way to make “elusive ideas
of truth, justice and reconciliation into something more concrete’ and to ensure that
22 See United Nations Human Rights Council, Study on the Right to the Truth, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/91,
8 February 2006.
23 Frédéric Mégret, ‘The International Criminal Court and the failure to mention symbolic reparations’, in
Social Science Research Network, 2008, p. 3, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1275087 (last visited 8 August 2011).
24 For an overview see Ofﬁce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Rule
of Law Tools for Post-conﬂict States: Reparation Programmes, United Nations, New York and Geneva,
2008, pp. 22–23.
25 James L. Cavalaro and Stephanie Erin Brewer, ‘Reevaluating regional human rights litigation in the
twenty-ﬁrst century: the case of the Inter-American Court’, in American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 102, No. 4, pp. 768–827.
26 F. Mégret, above note 23, p. 6.
27 C. Bassiouni, above note 20, p. 272.
28 Yael Danieli, ‘The right to restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms: preliminary reﬂections from a psychological perspective’, in
Eduardo Vetere and Pedro David (eds), Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, United Nations, New York,
2005, p. 261.
29 OHCHR, above note 24, p. 23.
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the physical, psychological and social damage in societies emerging from a violent
past is acknowledged and addressed”.30
Although the question of the potential application of international norms
to armed groups has been a subject of much attention recently, there seems to be a
major gap or blind spot in relation to the question of reparations and truth-recovery.
On the whole, there has been little attention to practical ways in which the principles
of reparations should and could apply to armed groups. While it is possible to detect
a growing appreciation that extending the applicability of reparation standards to
armed groups would be a logical consequence of treating their actions as violations
of international norms, most analysis and advocacy has remained tentative. There
are currently only modest efforts to search for concrete precedents of reparation-like
measures by armed groups or to explore practical modalities in which armed groups
could provide such measures. A survey and analysis of scholarly writing, United
Nations (UN) standard-making and practice, NGO advocacy, and other sources,
reveal an ambivalent and ambiguous state of affairs, where approaches to the rights
of victims of armed groups vis-à-vis the armed groups as collective entities remain
underdeveloped.
Gillard, for example, accepts that ‘a responsibility to make reparation
would be a natural consequence of the fact that organized armed groups are bound
by international humanitarian law’, but then merely asserts that ‘to date such
responsibility has taken the form of individual criminal responsibility of violators’.31
According to Kleffner, ‘the possibility of claiming reparations for the injury caused
[by organized armed groups] has thus far remained, in the main, a theoretical
one’.32 For Kleffner this remains the case notwithstanding a ‘growing recognition
that organized armed groups can be subjected to claims of reparations’.33 Sassòli
similarly ﬁnds that, while ‘logically’ a violation of norms by an armed group should
result in an obligation to provide reparations, ‘until now, such reparations were only
rarely asked from armed groups and even more rarely awarded to their victims’.34
The question of whether non-state armed groups have obligations to
provide reparations is not addressed explicitly in the Basic Principles. On the one
hand, the fact that the Basic Principles apply not only to victims of human rights
violations but also to those of violations of IHL (a framework where armed groups
have in some contexts duties analogous to states) could be seen as an indication that
armed groups could have obligations under this framework. The Basic Principles are
mostly formulated around the rights of victims – rather than in relation to the duty-
bearers – thus potentially leaving the question open. At the same time, General
Assembly Resolution 60/147, which adopted the Principles, referred explicitly only
30 J. Garcia-Godos, above note 18, pp. 64–65.
31 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, ‘Reparation for violations of international humanitarian law’, in International
Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No. 851, 2003, p. 535.
32 Jann Kleffner, ‘The collective accountability of organized armed groups for system crimes’, in André
Nollkaemper (ed.), System Criminality in International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2009, p. 255.
33 Ibid., p. 256.
34 M. Sassòli, above note 3, p. 47.
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to states, its preamble text reading as follows: ‘. . . recommends that States take the
Basic Principles and Guidelines into account’. There are also several explicit
references to states in the texts of Principles 4 and 5, for instance.
The ICRC study on customary IHL is also cautious and ambiguous on the
question of the existence of a duty by armed groups to provide reparations. On the
one hand, the study states that: ‘There is some practice to the effect that armed
opposition groups are required to provide appropriate reparation for the damage
resulting from violations of international humanitarian law’. However, the ICRC
also includes the hesitant statement that:
Even if it can be argued that armed opposition groups incur responsibility
for acts committed by persons forming part of such groups . . . the consequences
of such responsibility are not clear. In particular, it is unclear to what
extent armed opposition groups are under an obligation to make full
reparation . . .35
At the same time, it is interesting to note that the ICRC considered symbolic
reparation as part of the potential obligation of armed groups to provide reparations,
as it cites a public apology by an armed group in Colombia (for the killing of three
children in one of its armed attacks) as an indication of practice.36 Thus, there is
enough in the ICRC study to inspire interpretations calling for reparations from
armed groups,37 though it is not asserted as a fully binding international customary
norm, in sharp distinction to most other rules enumerated in the study. At the same
time, it must be recalled that the threshold for establishing a practice as a customary
norm is very high, and civil society advocacy organizations routinely rely on
standards – and progressive interpretations of standards – that have not yet reached
the status of customary law, or indeed call for the development of new standards
where there appears to be a gap in international norms.38
Turning to UN bodies, we discover a similarly ambivalent state of affairs.
Though UN treaty bodies such as the Human Rights Committee do not normally
address abuses by armed groups, in recent years there have been two high-proﬁle, ad
hoc United Nations bodies whose mandate extended to cover armed groups.
35 See rule 150 in the ICRC customary law study, Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds),
Customary International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, available at:
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule150 (last visited 8 August 2011).
36 Ibid., Vol. II, Ch. 42, Rule 150, Section C, XII.
37 For example, in an analysis of the ICRC study, Fleck argues that non-state actors have obligations ‘to make
reparations to victims of war for acts committed under their responsibility’, apparently with no
distinctions between them and states. See Dieter Fleck, ‘International accountability for violations of the
ius in bello: the impact of the ICRC study on customary international humanitarian law’, in Journal of
Conﬂict and Security Law, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2006, pp. 179–199.
38 It is interesting to note that the ICRC has recently identiﬁed the issue of reparation for victims of
violations as an area in which legal development is urgently required, and presumably this could include
the question of reparations by armed groups. See ‘Strengthening legal protection for victims of armed
conﬂicts: the ICRC study on the current state of international humanitarian law’, Address by Dr Jakob
Kellenberger, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 21 September 2010, available at:
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/ihl-development-statement-210910 (last visited 8
August 2011).
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As with much else on the issue, their practice was uneven and did not result
in a clear doctrine. On the one hand, The UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
suggested that non-state armed groups should provide reparations. That commis-
sion, which documented abuses by both the government of Sudan and several
rebel armed groups, proposed the establishment of a compensation mechanism
(Compensation Commission) as a component toward redressing the rights of the
victims of the conﬂict. Crucially, the commission noted, alongside the obligation
of the Sudanese government to pay compensation for crimes perpetrated in
Darfur by its agents, that: ‘[a] similar obligation is incumbent upon rebels for all
crimes they may have committed’.39 This is a clear and relatively authoritative
statement on the application of reparation duties to armed groups. However,
there has been a different approach by a similarly prominent UN commission of
inquiry: the Goldstone Commission, which examined the conﬂict in Gaza between
the state of Israel and Palestinian armed groups. Though the Goldstone
Commission (which operated after the Darfur Commission) documented and
condemned abuses by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups (against
both Israeli civilians and Palestinian residents of Gaza), it did not include a
recommendation to provide reparations to victims in its recommendations to
Palestinian armed groups.40 This omission is also important because Hamas has
had overall control of the territory and population of Gaza, and enjoys, on some
levels, a quasi-state status and a degree of de facto international recognition, all
attributes that make it a particularly ﬁtting addressee for a recommendation on
reparations.
Outside the UN, the work of several truth commissions involved forms of
collective accountability for armed groups. Many truth commissions documented,
analysed, and condemned actions by armed groups. Indeed, while UN human rights
bodies remain ambivalent in relation to armed groups, truth commissions have
become perhaps the main type of ofﬁcial body to offer a broad analysis of armed
groups’ conduct. Truth commissions that have addressed armed groups’ abuses
include, among others, those in El Salvador, Guatemala, South Africa, Peru, Sierra
Leone, and Liberia. On some occasions it has led to engagements by the armed
groups as such, or their leaders, with these bodies. The South African ANC’s
engagement with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission included forms of
symbolic reparations such as truth-recovery and acknowledgment, though the fact
that by that time the ANC had become the ruling party has complicated the
conceptual and legal signiﬁcance of its acts.41 In Sierra Leone several former high-
ranking Revolutionary United Front (RUF) commanders offered (limited) apologies
as part of reconciliation ceremonies performed during the truth commission’s
39 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, above note 5, para. 590 onwards, esp. para. 600.
40 See Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conﬂict, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, 15
September 2009, paras. 1770–1771. It is interesting to note, however, that the commission recommended
that the Palestinian Authority should ensure prompt and independent investigations of all allegations of
serious human rights violations.
41 Paul Gready, The Era of Transitional Justice: The Aftermath of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
South Africa and Beyond, Routledge, London, 2010, p. 41.
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public hearings.42 The Guatemalan guerrillas offered a public apology to victims
of their actions in the aftermath of the publication of the truth commission report.43
However, not all cases where a truth commission dealt with armed groups’
abuses involved engagement with members of the armed groups: in Peru, for
example, members of the main rebel group, Sendero Luminoso, were denied the
opportunity to testify before the commission.44 While several truth commissions
recommended providing reparations to victims of armed groups (including
commissions in Peru, Sierra Leone, and South Africa), the reparations were to be
provided by the state, rather than by the armed groups themselves.45 Thus, while
accepting that victims of armed groups have rights to reparations, these
commissions have not addressed the duty of such groups to provide those
reparations. In at least two other cases, individual members of armed groups were
required to provide forms of reparations as part of their reintegration: this involved
returning looted property in Colombia,46 and engagement with ‘traditional’
reconciliation mechanisms in Northern Uganda.47 While these are important
precedents, here as well the focus has been on engaging individuals rather than the
groups as collective entities.
In addition to these sources, it is also signiﬁcant that some leading
international human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International, have called on armed groups to provide reparations to
victims.48 At the same time, this practice has not been systematic, and rarely
involves public campaigning. It is further noteworthy that the inﬂuential
International Center for Transitional Justice, the leading international organization
working on transitional justice and reparations, appears not to have explored in any
depth the issue of claiming reparations and truth from armed groups.
What can be the reasons for this relative neglect of the question of
reparations from armed groups? Several potential explanations will be offered here.
The ﬁrst reason, as was detailed above, is the lack of an unequivocal international
42 Rosalind Shaw, ‘Linking justice with reintegration? Ex-combatants and the Sierra Leone experiment’, in
Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf (eds), Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities after
Mass Violence, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2010, pp. 127–129.
43 See ‘Guatemala rebels apologize for abuses during civil war’, in Miami Herald, 14 March 1999.
44 Theidon Kimberly, ‘Histories of innocence: postwar stories in Peru’, in R. Shaw and L. Waldorf, above
note 42, pp. 92–109.
45 Cecily Rose, ‘An emerging norm: the duty of states to provide reparations for human rights violations by
non-state actors’, in Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 33, 2010, pp. 307–344.
46 Catalina Diaz, ‘Challenging impunity from below: the contested ownership of transitional justice in
Colombia’, in Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (eds), Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots
Activism and the Struggle for Change, Hart, Oxford, 2008, pp. 189–216.
47 Erin Baines, ‘The haunting of Alice: local approaches to justice and reconciliation in northern Uganda’, in
International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 1, 2007, pp. 91–114.
48 See Human Rights Watch, Turning a Blind Eye: Impunity for Laws-of-War Violations during the Gaza
War, 2010, p. 47 (in relation to Hamas); Human Rights Watch, All Quiet on the Northern Front?
Uninvestigated Laws of War Violations in Yemen’s War with Huthi Rebels, 2010, p. 6 (in relation to Huthis
rebels); Amnesty International, Israel/Lebanon: Out of All Proportion: Civilians Bear the Brunt of the
War, 2006, p. 68 (in relation to Hezbollah).
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legal basis for such obligations. A related challenge is that there are few adequate
forums to pursue these claims:
Even when rules apply to non-state actors . . . in most cases no international
forum exists in which the individual victim, the injured state, an international
intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, or a third State could
invoke the responsibility of a non-State actor and obtain relief.49
Another problem is the general reluctance of states to recognize armed groups as
addressees of international norms – since this could confer a measure of legitimacy
on them.50 Such reluctance may be even more pronounced when it comes to
providing reparations, especially symbolic reparations, which could be seen as a
measure reserved for states. A third problem, mentioned above, is that it may seem
unfeasible to demand reparations from armed groups: for example, the International
Center for Transitional Justice argued that ‘it is usually not feasible to hold armed
groups, whether pro or anti-government, directly accountable for reparations’;51 and
Rose argued that ‘victims of atrocities committed by rebel groups are typically unable
to obtain reparations directly from their perpetrators’, one of the reasons being that
‘members of rebel groups are generally not capable of providing their victims with
reparations for the harm they have caused’.52 Finally, there appears to be a perception
that symbolic reparation is simply not relevant to armed groups. For example,
Kleffner asserts that ‘satisfaction’ as a form of reparation would not be transposed to
armed groups;53 Guembe and Olea reject the notion that ‘non-economic reparations’
could be a responsibility of an armed group, and argue that ‘[i]t is difﬁcult to imagine
that victims’ dignity depends on perpetrators’ actions’.54
Of these, it is likely that the last two have been the most important factors in
hampering an exploration of the issue of symbolic reparations from armed groups:
such reparations appear both unfeasible and unnecessary. However, as is argued
below, there are contexts in which such measures would both be feasible and would
serve an important function for their victims. Indeed, it is demonstrated below that
precedents of armed groups providing measures analogous to symbolic reparations
already exist, but they have remained ‘below the radar’ of the relevant literature and
regrettably have not been recognized as such. A careful analysis of these cases will
reveal the potential of symbolic reparations from armed groups and will hopefully
lead tomore sustained engagement with this issue by both scholars and practitioners.
49 M. Sassòli, above note 3, p. 7.
50 ‘States do not wish to attribute government-like qualities to these groups. Conferring international legal
personality on armed groups would involve recognizing the existence of another authority within the
state’, L. Zegveld, above note 4, pp. 162–163.
51 ICTJ, Providing Meaningful Reparations to Victims, Brieﬁng, December 2009, available at: http://www.
iccnow.org/documents/ICTJ_SDN_brieﬁng_AUPD-Reparatns.pdf (last visited 20 January 2012).
52 C. Rose, above note 45, pp. 309–310.
53 J. Kleffner, above note 32, p. 265.
54 Maria José Guembe and Helena Olea, ‘No justice, no peace: discussion of a legal framework regarding the
demobilization of non-state armed groups in Colombia’, in Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena
(eds), Transitional Justice in the Twenty-ﬁrst Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 136.
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Armed groups’ attacks against their ‘own side’: the potential
for truth and reparations
Having identiﬁed the general gap in relation to armed groups, the next step should
be beginning to identify suitable thematic ‘entry points’ that could allow exploration
of the potential for armed groups to provide symbolic reparations. As explained
below, I argue that attacks against alleged informers is an issue that could be
particularly ﬁtting for such measures. Although attention by governments and the
media normally tends to focus on armed groups’ attacks against government forces
and the civilian population associated with the government side, punishment of
alleged informers from within the organization’s own ranks, or from the community
it seeks to represent,55 are common to virtually all armed groups. Armed groups,
such as FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia),56 the Taliban,57 GAM
(the Free Aceh Movement),58 Palestinian armed groups,59 the PKK (Kurdistan
Workers’ Party),60 and ETA,61 as well as Hezbollah, the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam) and the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso),62 have all killed informers
or suspected informers. In a typology of political violence, such attacks are
considered as ‘horizontal violence’, directed at an armed group’s own ostensible
constituency, as opposed to the more common ‘vertical violence’ directed at
government targets.63 Almost invariably, such attacks by armed groups also involve
killings and other abuses against individuals who were not in fact informers, either
because of intelligence or operational mistakes, or because of malicious false
denunciations.64 Depending on the context, such attacks can be considered as
human rights abuses or violations of IHL, and they will virtually always constitute
crimes under domestic law.
I argue that the potential for measures of dealing with the past –
self-critique and reaching out to victims during transitions out of conﬂict – by
armed groups could be relatively signiﬁcant in relation to such attacks on
55 Anti-state armed groups that seek independence, autonomy, the end of perceived foreign or hostile
domination, or a radical transformation of the political order, tend to operate within a broader
community, usually with similar national, ethnic, religious, cultural, or linguistic attributes, in which there
is usually wide passive support for the goals (if not always the means) of the group, from which active
members are recruited, and which the group can claim as a constituency.
56 Eric Fichtl, ‘The ambiguous nature of collaboration in Colombia’, in Colombia Journal, 29 March 2004.
57 Amnesty International, ‘As if Hell Fell on Me’: The Human Rights Crisis in Northwest Pakistan, 2010, pp.
45–46.
58 Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: The War in Aceh, 2001, p. 23.
59 Hillel Cohen and Ron Dudai, ‘Human rights dilemmas in using informers to combat terrorism’, in
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2005, pp. 229–243.
60 Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence, New York University
Press, New York, 2007, p. 135.
61 Joseba Zulaika, Basque Violence: Metaphor and Sacrament, University of Nevada Press, Reno, NV, 1988,
p. 85.
62 Brendan O’Leary and Andrew Silke, ‘Understanding and ending persistent conﬂicts’, in Marianne
Heiberg, Brendan O’Leary, and John Tirman (eds), Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted
Conﬂicts, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA, 2007, p. 398.
63 Don Foster, Paul Haupt, and Marésa de Beer, The Theatre of Violence: Narratives of Protagonists in the
South African Conﬂict, Human Sciences Research Council Press, Cape Town, 2005, pp. 60–62.
64 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 342.
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individuals from the groups’ ‘own side’. One main reason is that this is an issue
where an armed group could face pressure from its own constituency to account for
its conduct, rather than from the state’s or ‘enemy’ side, or from outsiders from the
international community. Informers and others who are considered ‘traitors’ are
often hate ﬁgures in their communities and members of the community would often
not disapprove of abuses of informers.65 But community members would be critical
if the status of informers was applied unfairly to some individuals, and may demand
a higher level of ‘procedural’ legitimacy when dealing with suspected informers than
when dealing with other targets. As, almost by deﬁnition, the suspected traitors
come from the heart of the organization and the community, if they or their relatives
demand truth and accountability, such a campaign comes from within the armed
group’s areas of support and could be more difﬁcult to ignore. ‘Internal’ critique of
armed group actions toward members of the community can also be seen as more
legitimate and safer than criticizing the armed group for methods of attack against
the perceived enemy.66 This could make it harder for the armed group to resist
pressure to confront such abuses, in comparison to pressure coming from the
‘enemy’ side or from outsiders. As the status of being labelled as informer typically
leads to ostracism and harassment of the individuals and often also of their families,
they may be keen to use a general atmosphere of transition out of violence to
attempt to clear their or their relatives’ names.
A second facilitating factor is that armed groups’ attacks on suspected
informers tend to be more regulated than attacks on the government side, and
sometimes involve a quasi-judicial process by the armed group. While armed
groups usually attack government personnel or supporters based on their general
afﬁliation (according to the group’s deﬁnition of ‘legitimate target’), in the case of
punishing their own members or supporters armed groups will often engage in
some process of determining individual ‘guilt’. Thus, for example, the Frente
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador,67 the South
African ANC in its camps in exile,68 the Uniﬁed Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-
M),69 the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP),70 and Maoist
65 Ron Dudai and Hillel Cohen, ‘Triangle of betrayal: collaborators and transitional justice in the Israeli–
Palestinian Conﬂict’, in Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 37–58.
66 For example, Palestinian civil society organizations have normally been reluctant to criticize publicly
abuses of Palestinian armed groups against Israeli civilians (most notably suicide bombings), but have
done so in relation to armed groups’ killings of suspected Palestinian informers. See e.g. Palestinian
Human Rights Monitoring Group, The ‘Intra’fada: The Chaos of the Weapons, 2004; Palestinian Centre
for Human Rights, ‘2 Palestinians killed by Palestinian armed groups in the West Bank: extra-judicial
assassination of citizens for suspected treason’, Field Update, 21 March 2006, available at: http://www.
pchrgaza.org/portal/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3094:2-palestinians-killed-by-
palestinian-armed-groups-in-the-west-bank-&catid=61:ﬁeld-update-security-chaos-&Itemid=211 (last
visited 20 January 2012).
67 Americas Watch, Violations of Fair Trial Guarantees by the FMLN, 1990.
68 Stephen Ellis, ‘Mbokodo: security in ANC camps, 1961–1990’, in African Affairs, Vol. 93, 1994,
pp. 279–298.
69 Jonathan Somer, ‘Jungle justice: passing sentence on the equality of belligerents in non-international
armed conﬂict’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 867, 2007, pp. 681–682.
70 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip
Alston: Mission to the Philippines, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/3/Add.2, 16 April 2008, paras. 31–33, available
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groups in India71 all punished their own members or members of their community
suspected as being informers using a relatively formalized ‘court’ system. This factor
is important for several reasons. First, it could allow the group to admit ‘procedural’
mistakes, without necessarily disavowing their entire ideology and practice. Second,
the process of deliberations over individual guilt of a group’s member could leave
some form of material evidence (by way of records of confessions, court procedure,
and so on), which could be used in a truth-recovery process. These features could
contribute to making abuses of alleged informers a suitable topic for an armed
group to begin confronting its past conduct.
The precedent of the African National Congress inquiries
Indeed, I argue that it is not a coincidence that perhaps the most notable
example thus far of an armed group confronting its past abuses was in relation
to attacks on suspected informers. I refer to public inquiries established by the
South African ANC in the early 1990s to examine allegations of abuses against
suspected informers in its ranks. In Hayner’s oft-cited survey of truth commissions,
these inquiries are noted as the only example of a truth commission established
by a non-state armed group.72 It is important to note that these inquiries
took place when the ANC was still an opposition group, and was not yet elected to
power.
Although rumours and allegations of abuses against suspected informers in
the ANC camps in exile had been circulating for a long time, it was only after the
ban on the ANC was lifted in 1990 that the accusations were made public. Pressure
came from individual ANC members who were detained and tortured by the ANC,
and from the relatives of ANC members who did not return from exile and whose
fate remained unknown. Some of the ANC members formed a Returned Exiles
Committee to take the ANC to task. In 1992 Nelson Mandela established a
‘Commission for Enquiry into Complaints by Former African National Congress
Prisoners and Detainees’, known as the Skweyiya Commission, and a follow-up
commission, the Motsuenyane Commission, was established the following year. The
Motsuenyane Commission was directed by three commissioners, two of them from
outside South Africa; it held public hearings and its proceedings were close to formal
court hearings. Both commissions found evidence for abuses by ANC cadres against
suspected informers in its ranks. Nelson Mandela accepted collective responsibility
on the part of the leadership of the ANC, and issued an apology.73 These steps can
be seen as akin to symbolic reparations. The ANC experience in confronting its past
at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/130/01/PDF/G0813001.pdf?OpenElement (last
visited 20 January 2012).
71 Human Rights Watch, ‘Being Neutral is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, and Naxalite Abuses
in India’s Chhattisgarh State, 2008, p. 11.
72 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions, Routledge,
New York, 2002, p. 60.
73 See Kenneth Christie, The South African Truth Commission, Palgrave, New York, 2000, pp. 79–80;
Priscilla Hayner, ‘Fifteen truth commissions 1974 to 1994: a comparative study’, in Human Rights
Quarterly, Vol. 16, 1994, pp. 632–633.
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abuses was certainly not fully successful.74 However, it does serve as an important
precedent, demonstrating that in the right conditions an armed group is capable of
engaging in such endeavours. The ANC inquiries brought at least some measure
of redress to victims, and exposed the ANC to public embarrassment and shaming.
Several factors made this undertaking by the ANC feasible. First, the
pressure to account, emanating from the heart of the movement, made it difﬁcult for
the ANC to avoid the topic. The abuses against alleged informers in the ANC camps
were not necessarily the most severe or widespread abuses that the ANC had been
involved in, but – as was explained above – the fact that the targets were from the
very centre of the organization and the community meant that the ANC was more
likely to engage with them. Second, the organizational nature of the ANC was an
important factor. The ANC’s internal cohesion and disciplined organizational
culture,75 and the authority and respect that the leadership (especially Mandela)
enjoyed among the organization’s members, meant that the leadership could
successfully hold these inquiries. Its capacity to do so was also helped by the nature
of the abuses, which involved court-martials and hearings, and which left
evidentiary tracks that assisted the work of the commissions.
Over time, however, the prominence of the subsequent South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission may have ended up almost completely
overshadowing the ANC’s earlier inquiries, which tend to be omitted from general
narratives of the development of transitional justice. Rather than becoming a model
for innovative mechanisms to hold armed groups to account and provide some
measure of redress to their victims, the ANC inquiries have by and large been
ignored or even actively excluded by scholars of truth commissions and symbolic
reparations. In an important study of truth commissions, Freeman has criticized the
notion that the ANC inquiries should be seen as a truth commission. Rather than
gauging the potential of such undertakings to contribute to symbolic reparations for
victims, his only reference to the ANC effort was to point out that, since it was not
set up and authorized by a state, it cannot be considered as a truth commission.76
The recent second edition of Hayner’s survey of truth commission has omitted
the earlier edition’s reference to the ANC commissions.77 Nevertheless, the ANC’s
exercise remains a powerful demonstration of the potential of non-state armed
groups voluntarily to adopt collective measures of confronting their own past
abuses.
74 For a critical view on these commissions, arguing that they did not result in concrete alleviation of the
victims’ suffering, see Todd Cleveland, ‘“We still want the truth”: the ANC’s Angolan detention camps
and post-apartheid memory’, in Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. 25,
No. 1, 2005, pp. 63–78.
75 Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, Comrades against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African
Communist Party in Exile, James Currey, London, 1992.
76 Mark Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2006, p. 18.
77 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions, 2nd
edition, Routledge, New York, 2010.
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Symbolic reparations from armed groups in practice: the
IRA case
The remainder of this article takes the discussion forward by focusing on one
concrete example of an armed group providing at least some measures of truth-
recovery and symbolic reparation in the aftermath of a conﬂict: the IRA in Northern
Ireland after the 1998 Belfast Agreement. As will be shown below, over this period
the IRA has engaged in a series of acts that closely resemble actions that states are
required to take as part of their obligations to provide redress to victims of abuses.
This has been especially marked in relation to IRA abuses against suspected
informers: the IRA leadership has disclosed truth about disappearances of alleged
informers, admitted false accusations against suspected informers, and offered
acknowledgment and apologies. As will be detailed below, these acts clearly
correspond to measures of symbolic reparations as provided in the Basic Principles.
It is a curious fact that these measures by the IRA have generally not yet
been explored in the transitional justice literature and the literature on engaging
with armed groups. This is a glaring omission, especially given that the conﬂict in
Northern Ireland – and the IRA’s role in it – has been one of the most extensively
studied cases of political violence in modern times. This omission may be
symptomatic of a tendency in the literature to focus on legal and conceptual debates,
often at the expense of attention to developments on the ground.
It is crucial to note the importance of the group’s organizational structure
for the feasibility of pursuing such measures of dealing with the past. The IRA,
though it never maintained long-term control over territory (as armed groups such
as FARC or LTTE did), has been a relatively organized, centralized, and disciplined
armed group.78 As with the example of the ANC, such organizational features are
vital for the feasibility of efforts to uncover details about past actions and offer
authoritative acknowledgment and apology.
In the remainder of this section, I will begin by identifying and analysing
two areas in which the IRA addressed aspects of its past treatment of alleged
informers.79 The ﬁrst of these is in relation to ‘disappearances’ of alleged informers,
where the organization passed on details of the location of their bodies and
apologized for the suffering caused to their families owing to the withholding of
information. The second is in relation to the killing of wrongly accused informers,
where the organization ‘exonerated’ individuals formerly labelled as informers.
Subsequently, I will brieﬂy show that the IRA also engaged in symbolic reparations
beyond the issue of informers. Finally, I will explore the implication of the IRA’s
reliance on its own code of conduct – rather than international norms – in
addressing its past actions.
78 See Kieran McEvoy, Paramilitary Imprisonment in Northern Ireland, Clarendon, Oxford, 2001, p. 11.
79 On the issue of IRA informers and the treatment of real and alleged informers more generally, see Ron
Dudai, ‘Informers and the transition in Northern Ireland’, in British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 52,
No. 1, 2012, pp. 32–54.
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The IRA and ‘the disappeared’: veriﬁcation of the facts and public
disclosure of the truth
The issue of disappearances has been central to the development of the notion of
symbolic reparations and more speciﬁcally the concept of a right to truth.80
Although never reaching anything remotely resembling the scale of the abuse in
Latin America, the Northern Ireland conﬂict also featured the phenomenon of
disappearances: in the 1970s and 1980s, the IRA abducted, killed, and secretly
buried several alleged informers, as well as a few of its members suspected of stealing
weapons or of other violations of discipline.81 They have come to be known as ‘the
disappeared’ in local parlance. The suffering of the families of the disappeared
reached public prominence only after the peace process had begun: ‘most of the
families suffered in silence over the years, speaking out only after the IRA’s 1994
ceaseﬁre’.82 This is similar to the way in which accusations regarding the ANC’s
treatment of alleged informers in exile have surfaced and reached public
prominence only after the South African peace process has begun. The most
compelling pressure levelled at the IRA came from the families themselves.83 At
least some of the families came from within republican communities, as most of the
disappeared were IRA members and many of their family members and friends
remain aligned with the republican movement. This type of pressure, from within its
own constituency, was difﬁcult for the IRA to defy, or to portray as mere state-led
propaganda. It perhaps also legitimized and eased the process from the IRA’s
perspective, since it could maintain that it is bowing to internal pressure rather than
to demands from the British state.
In 1998 the IRA announced that it had set up a special investigating
unit, headed by a person the IRA deﬁned as one of its most senior ofﬁcers, in
order to investigate the disappearances and attempt to locate the whereabouts of
the bodies of those killed and secretly buried.84 Subsequently, the IRA formally
admitted for the ﬁrst time that it was responsible for the killing and disappearances
of several individuals. In addition to the acknowledgment the IRA also issued an
apology. It called the disappearances an ‘injustice for which we accept full
responsibility’ and added ‘we are sorry that this has taken so long to resolve and
for prolonged anguish caused to the families’.85 Shortly after, information
received from the IRA led to the discovery of the bodies of several of the
80 United Nations Human Rights Council, above note 22, para. 8.
81 See e.g. Ed Moloney, Voices from The Grave: Two Men’s War in Ireland, Public Affairs, New York, 2010,
pp. 111–132.
82 David McKittrick, ‘The bloodstained soil of Ireland yields ﬁrst of the “disappeared”’, in The Independent,
29 May 1999.
83 See e.g. Kim Sengupta, ‘Families appeal to IRA over graves’, in The Independent, 8 September 1998.
84 See ‘Help us ﬁnd bodies – IRA’, in BBC News, 8 December 1998, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
events/northern_ireland/latest_news/230227.stm (last visited 20 January 2012); ‘IRA continues search for
missing bodies’, in An Phoblacht, 10 December 1998, available at: http://www.anphoblacht.com/news/
detail/31650 (last visited 20 January 2012).
85 ‘IRA investigation locates grave sites’, in An Phoblacht, 1 April 1999, available at: http://www.anphoblacht.
com/news/detail/32141 (last visited 20 January 2012). The IRA later admitted responsibility for the
disappearances of two other people.
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disappeared,86 and others have been discovered in the succeeding years.87 In 2003,
following the discovery of one body, the IRA issued a statement reiterating its
apology:
. . . we would like to take this opportunity to state our position in relation to
those killed and buried by the IRA. We are sorry that the suffering of those
families has continued for so long. We wish to apologise for the grief caused.88
Republican sources reported continuing efforts to locate the whereabouts of the
remaining missing bodies;89 at the time of writing, the latest recovery of a body took
place in November 2010.90
The IRA’s engagement with the issue of the disappeared demonstrates the
capacity of armed groups to provide at least some measures of symbolic reparations.
Throughout, this has been a collective measure, taken by, and on behalf of, the
organization as such. Many of the IRA’s actions closely resemble the type of
symbolic reparations that would have been required from states under similar
circumstances. Some of the relevant speciﬁc obligations as formulated in the Basic
Principles require states responsible for human rights violations to provide: ‘[v]
eriﬁcation of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth . . .’;91 ‘[t]he search
for the whereabouts of the disappeared . . .’;92 and ‘[p]ublic apology, including
acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility . . .’.93 The actions of
the IRA in relation to the disappeared correspond to these obligations: the IRA has
acknowledged the commission of wrongful acts; taken responsibility for them;
recognized the consequences of these acts for victims; expressed regret; offered a
formal apology; and provided factual disclosure of the truth, including the location
of missing bodies. It has thus acted according to some of the international norms
86 D. McKittrick, above note 82.
87 The actual recovery was carried out by a special body, the Independent Commission for the Location of
Victims Remains (ICLVR), which was established by the British and Irish governments to co-ordinate the
search for the disappeared. According to the legislation setting up the ICLVR, information passed in
relation to locations of disappeared will be inadmissible in courts and forensic examination of the bodies
will be limited to identifying the individuals and will not be used in police investigation. This was set up in
two parallel legalizations, in the UK and in the Republic of Ireland: the Northern Ireland (Location of
Victims’ Remains Act) 1999 (in the UK) and the Criminal Justice (Location of Victims’ Remains Act)
1999 (in the Irish Republic).
88 See Sinn Féin statement, available at: http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/15239 (last visited 8 August 2010).
89 ‘Republican efforts continue to retrieve missing bodies’, in An Phoblacht, 13 July 2006, available at: http://
www.anphoblacht.com/news/detail/15069 (last visited 20 January 2012); ‘IRA “was wrong” over bodies
issue’, in BBC News, 11 July 2006, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/5170594.stm
(last visited 20 January 2012).
90 See updated details on the ICLVR website, available at: http://www.iclvr.ie/en/ICLVR/Pages/
TheDisappeared (last visited 1 September 2010). Many of the bodies were secretly buried in beaches,
and the shifting and difﬁcult terrain meant that the location of bodies has been difﬁcult even when
information was passed from the IRA. A former senior police ofﬁcer who directs the ICLVR’s investigative
forensic work has conﬁrmed that the information received has been mostly accurate and of high quality:
see ‘Interview with Geoff Knupfer’, in BBC News, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ire-
land/8020817.stm (last visited 1 September 2010).
91 Basic Principles, Art. 22(b).
92 Ibid., Art. 22(c).
93 Ibid., Art. 22(e).
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that usually apply to states, and showed that armed groups could and should, at least
in some circumstances, be held to account using broadly the same standards as
states.
To be sure, the IRA did not comply with all the relevant obligations. It did
not offer monetary compensation to victims, and it did not identify individual
perpetrators for prosecutions – indeed, as explained above, the passing of truth in
relation to location of the disappeared was premised on de facto immunity from
prosecutions. However, as shown above, the IRA did provide symbolic reparations,
including truth. In that sense it presents one concrete example of an armed group
providing state-like measures of symbolic reparations.
It is important to note also that this process, in which the IRA has been
confronting some of its past abuses, seems to have been an important component in
the process of conﬂict-transformation and conﬁdence-building in the immediate
aftermath of the 1998 Belfast Agreement. It has provided an implicit conﬁrmation of
the IRA’s shift from political violence to peaceful engagement. As McEvoy and
Conway wrote: ‘The spectacle of diggers removing hundreds of tons of earth from
remote parts of Ireland, surrounded by media and anxious families, was a powerful
symbol of the attempts at a transition from a violent past.’94
The IRA and wrongly accused informers: restoring the reputation
of victims?
One of the speciﬁc forms of symbolic reparations included in the Basic Principles is
‘an ofﬁcial declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the reputation and
the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the victim’.95 This is
an emblematic example of symbolic reparations: a non-monetary act, designed to
respond to the needs of victims in particular circumstances. Several reparations
programmes established by states included speciﬁc measures ‘to rehabilitate not just
the health of victims but what may be called their “civic status”. These include
measures to restore the good name of victims by making public declarations of their
innocence, expunging criminal records . . .’.96 This form of symbolic reparation
applies, for example, to individuals who were wrongly accused or convicted by past
regimes, where the material and symbolic status of being convicted carries a difﬁcult
burden for them or their families.97 One of the aims of such measures is to lead to
94 Kieran McEvoy and Heather Conway, ‘The dead, the law and the politics of the past’, in Journal of Law
and Society, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2004, p. 560.
95 Basic Principles, Art. 22(d).
96 OHCHR, above note 24, p. 25.
97 An example of this type of reparation is the case of Juan Manuel Contreras San Martín et al. v. Chile, in the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, where, as a form of reparation for individuals wrongly convicted
of crimes, the government has agreed in a friendly settlement: ‘[t]o publicly provide reparation to the
victims before their community by means by an act of the Regional Government duly disseminated by
the mass media, designed to restore their reputation and honor that had been certainly damaged by the
judicial decisions that once harmed them’. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Juan Manuel
Contreras San Martín et al. v. Chile, Case 11.715, Report No. 32/02, 12 March 2002, para. 14.
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reintegration of victims (including families of those who were killed or executed) in
society.98
At ﬁrst glance this form of symbolic reparation may seem completely
inapplicable to non-state armed groups. The notion that armed groups can be
involved in rehabilitation, can bestow a good name on anyone or restore their civic
status, may seem out of place. And yet, the IRA has been engaging in a process that
can be seen to provide exactly such measure of reparation. The IRA has conducted
several investigations aimed at responding to claims that individuals that it killed in
the past as alleged informers were not in fact informers and were wrongly accused.99
In these cases the IRA responded to pressure from relatives and friends of those
killed, who sought precisely this form of symbolic reparation: restoring the good
names and dignity of their loved ones.
As in many societies that experience political conﬂict, in Northern Ireland
informers were and remain hate ﬁgures.100 The term ‘informer’ is the deepest insult
in republican vocabulary.101 Being considered as an informer carries a very heavy
stigma and social ostracism, which also affects their family members. For example, a
relative of an IRA member killed by the organization as an alleged informer said
that: ‘It’s one of the most hated things in the world that your father was an informer
or your grandfather was an informer’.102 The problem is particularly intense
because republican communities tend to be small and close-knit, and is especially
painful for families who maintain links to the republican movement.103 With this
background, it is easy to appreciate that an opportunity to clear the names of
relatives accused of informing, restoring their good name and their ‘community
status’ if not ‘civic status’, would in fact be of paramount importance to victims. For
example, a woman whose brother was killed as an informer by the IRA has recently
campaigned to get the IRA to ‘tell me the truth, to clear my brother’s name and to
give us an apology’, in order to help the family.104 As an ex-IRA member explained
to the author in an interview: ‘[t]here’s no greater insult that you can call a person
than to call him an informer. So families do want the names of their loved-ones
cleared and have them exonerated, if possible.’105
98 F. Mégret, above note 23.
99 There is some overlap with the issue of the disappeared, but most individuals killed by the IRA as alleged
informers were not disappeared. On the killings of informers by the IRA, see e.g. Ed Moloney, A Secret
History of the IRA, 2nd edition, Penguin, London, 2007.
100 Kevin Toolis, Rebel Hearts: Journeys within the IRA’s Soul, Picador, London, 1995, p. 194; R. Dudai, above
note 79.
101 Susan McKay, Bear in Mind These Dead, Faber and Faber, London, 2009, p. 235.
102 Ardoyne Commemoration Project, Ardoyne: The Untold Truth, Beyond the Pale Publications, Belfast,
2002, p. 367.
103 In an interview with the author, an ex-combatant and community activist said that: ‘When somebody was
outed as an informer, the families felt themselves distanced from the republican community, because it
was the republican community that killed their loved ones – but they were supposed to be part of it. They
partly withdrew, because of the shame. The civilian population, especially young adults, didn’t help
because they inﬂicted a lot of cruelty on them’. Interview in Belfast, April 2009.
104 S. McKay, above note 101, p. 235.
105 Interview with ex-combatant, Belfast, August 2010.
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A process of re-examining the veracity of accusation of informing against
some of those killed as informers has begun after the IRA initiated its inquiry in
relation to the locations of the disappeared. In this case, the pressure for the process
came almost exclusively from families and individuals from within the republican
movement. As with the ANC inquiries and the IRA inquiries in relation to the
disappeared, it could only become possible once the transition out of conﬂict had
begun. In particular, it involved pressure not just from families but even from
former combatants who felt uneasy about their comrades who were killed and were
willing to push for investigations.106
Part of the momentum for this process came following reliable claims that a
senior member of the IRA’s internal security unit, a unit whose task was to unearth
informers in the organization’s ranks, was himself an informer.107 This revelation
has led many to suspect the credibility of accusations made by this unit over the
years. As a result, the IRA ‘has been coming under intense pressure in Catholic areas
from families of IRA men killed for informing’.108 However, it is important to note
that the process of these IRA inquiries had begun before these revelations, and while
they are certainly one of the key factors facilitating it, they did not provide the
exclusive factor behind the IRA inquiries.
As a result of this process of investigations, which were conducted by a
panel relying on interviewing members and uncovering any remaining material
evidence, the IRA has made several public declarations ‘exonerating’ individuals
who were long accused of being informers, expunging their guilt in the eyes of the
community. Such statements are usually issued in republican publications109 and
later reported by the wider media. For example, in one case, the IRA stated that its
investigation found no evidence to support the claims made at the time that a
member ‘was responsible for passing information concerning the location of arms
dumps and the movement of Volunteers’.110 The IRA also apologized to the family
of another member wrongly accused.111 In another example, the IRA issued an
apology following an ‘in-depth inquiry’ into the circumstances surrounding the
killing of a member, stating among other points that while ‘[a]t the time allegations
were made that he was an informer’, those allegations have not been accurate.112
106 Interview with ex-combatant, Belfast, August 2010. In the interview, he explained further the dynamics
behind such pressure from republicans: ‘There’s a tendency in a conﬂict situation that your ﬁrst priority is
to protect the army, and everything else is secondary. That happened and the leadership wasn’t
questioned. Like any other army the IRA wasn’t a democratic organization. It’s only when you’re coming
out of conﬂict that the possibility opens up to look at previous actions.’
107 Rosie Cowan, ‘He did the IRA’s dirty work for 25 years – and was paid £80,000 a year by the government’,
in The Guardian, 12 May 2003.
108 Jim Cusack, ‘Terror chiefs say “Sorry” to families of slain informers’, in The Independent, 5 October 2003.
109 Normally by way of a statement from the IRA published in the republican weekly An Phoblacht, usually
signed by the codename P. O’Neill, the traditional code attesting to the authenticity of statements from
the IRA.
110 ‘IRA Statement’, in An Phoblacht, 25 September 2003, available at: http://www.anphoblacht.com/news/
detail/1407 (last visited 20 January 2012).
111 J. Cusack, above note 108.
112 ‘IRA apology’, in An Phoblacht, 5 April 2007, available at: http://www.anphoblacht.com/news/detail/18563
(last visited 20 January 2012).
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In 2009 the IRA issued a statement acknowledging that a person killed as an alleged
informer was not in fact an informer and that ‘[h]opefully the stigma which
surrounded Bernard’s death will now be removed and this will help the Teggart
family who have suffered grievously as the result of the conﬂict’.113 Other similar
cases, where relatives and friends of people killed as informers demand inquiries and
apologies from the IRA leadership, continue to emerge.114
The process of making public declarations acknowledging that past
accusations were wrong, and the associated removal of painful stigma, can fairly
easily be seen as a form of symbolic reparation akin to what human rights advocates
demand from states in analogous circumstances. It corresponds to the modality of
reparation, mentioned above, of ‘an ofﬁcial declaration . . . restoring the dignity,
the reputation and the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the
victim’.115 The important point to make here is that those seeking the ‘restoration
of dignity’ were looking for the armed group – not the state – to make these
declarations. Their demand for redress was targeted at the armed group. While
the legal and conceptual implications of treating armed groups such as the IRA as
able to provide symbolic reparations may be uncharted territory currently,
the potential to contribute to improvement in victims’ lives should perhaps be the
decisive factor.116
Indeed, at least according to several public statements by families, it seems
that the IRA inquiries led to positive results in terms of the families’ wellbeing, and
even rehabilitation. Although it is impossible to rule out the possibility that these
statements were compelled by the circumstances in which these families live, the
sentiments, and especially the sense of relief, appear genuine. For example, a brother
of one IRA member who was exonerated from being an informer conﬁrmed that, as
far as the family are concerned, his good name has been restored, and added: ‘We
are on a journey seeking digniﬁed closure. We believe the army [IRA] investigation
has played a role in helping us reach the end of that long journey.’117 The family of
another exonerated member said that they ‘welcome this latest [IRA] statement
clearing our son and brother . . . of being an informer’ and ‘express our sincere
gratitude to the Republican Movement and the present day leadership’.118 Such
responses from victims are perhaps the most powerful impetus to explore further
mechanisms through which armed groups could provide this type of redress.
113 ‘15-year-old Bernard Teggart was not an informer’, in An Phoblacht, 6 August 2009, available at: http://
www.anphoblacht.com/news/detail/38660 (last visited 20 January 2012).
114 See e.g. ‘Killed for being an informer, but it was just a lie’, in Belfast Telegraph, 25 September 2010.
115 Basic Principles, Art. 22(d).
116 In addition, another consideration could be that campaigning for armed groups to provide symbolic
reparations could also be a method of publicly ‘shaming’ groups that commit abuses.
117 ‘Volunteer cleared in IRA probe: Lenadoon man was not paid informer, family is told after in-depth
inquiry’, in Irelandclick.com, 25 September 2003, available at: http://www.nuzhound.com/articles/
Irelandclick/arts2003/sep25_IRA_volunteer_cleared.php (last visited 8 August 2010).
118 ‘Statement from the Braniff family in Belfast’, in An Phoblacht, 25 September 2003, available at: http://
www.anphoblacht.com/news/detail/1407 (last visited 20 January 2012). See also e.g. Suzanne McGonagle,
‘Murdered teen’s family welcome admission he was not an informer’, in Irish News, 7 August 2009.
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Beyond informers: symbolic reparations in relation to other victims
This article is focused on the issue of attacks on alleged informers as a topic with
a relatively high potential to generate symbolic reparations from armed groups.
However, it is important to note this is not the only issue that could have such a
potential. Indeed, the IRA’s activities in relation to its past actions have also moved
beyond this issue. In 2002 the organization issued a broad apology for ‘all of the
deaths and injuries of non-combatants’ caused by the organization.119 Later, in
several cases the organization took responsibility for speciﬁc accidental killings it
had hitherto denied involvement in, provided details in relation to its actions, and
offered acknowledgment and apologies.
For example, in 2005, following a request from a family to examine the
circumstances surrounding the killing three decades earlier of a 14-year-old girl,
the IRA took responsibility for the killing – a killing that the organization had
hitherto denied its involvement in – and ‘apologized unreservedly’ to her family.120
In 2006 the IRA issued a statement about an incident in which one person
was killed, following a request from a family ‘to investigate the circumstances
surrounding’ the death of their loved one. At the time of the killing the IRA did
not acknowledge involvement in the incident. In its statement, the IRA revealed
that the man was killed when an explosive device, intended for a British army
patrol, was detonated prematurely, and conﬁrmed that he was not an IRA member
and was not involved in the operation. The statement added that ‘the IRA
leadership offers its sincere apologies to the . . . family for the death of Eugene and
for the heartache and trauma that our actions have caused’.121 In 2007 the IRA
admitted that a 17-month-old girl was killed in Belfast in the 1970s after she was
struck by a ricochet when the IRA ﬁred shots at a British army patrol. In this case
also, the IRA initially denied involvement, and in its statement the IRA leadership
offered apology to the family ‘for the pain and heartache that they have suffered as
a result of our action’.122 These are just few examples of a broader process, and
they show that the actions in relation to alleged informers can also be transposed
to other cases. They demonstrate again that there are cases in which it will be
feasible for an armed group to provide at least some measure of symbolic
reparation.
119 IRA statement from 16 July 2002. The full text is available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/
ira160702.htm (last visited 8 August 2010).
120 The girl was killed by a stray bullet from an IRA unit shooting at a British army patrol. The IRA at the time
claimed that she was killed by British Army bullets and even later claimed that it had killed a soldier in
retaliation. See Eamonn MacDermott, ‘IRA apologise for death of Derry schoolgirl’, in Derry Journal, 24
June 2005. The full text of the IRA 2005 statement is available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/ira/
ira230605.htm (last visited 8 August 2011).
121 ‘IRA apology’, in An Phoblacht, 13 April 2006, available at: http://www.anphoblacht.com/news/detail/
13838 (last visited 20 January 2012).
122 ‘IRA offers apology’, in An Phoblacht, 6 September 2007, available at: http://www.anphoblacht.com/news/
detail/20561 (last visited 20 January 2012).
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Symbolic reparations and the reliance on armed groups’ ‘codes
of conduct’
The literature on engagement with armed groups identiﬁes the adoption of ‘codes of
conducts’ by armed groups as one of the effective ways of encouraging compliance
with international legal norms by these groups.123 While the literature on
engagement gives a prominent place to the adoption of codes of conduct during a
conﬂict, only scant attention has been given to their possible use as normative
framework during a process of dealing with the past.
In this context, it is interesting to note that the ANC’s commissions of
inquiry, referred to above, used its code of conduct as the normative point of
reference and characterized its relevant conduct as violations of the code (the ANC
also made references to human rights norms, though these references generally
remained abstract and did not refer to speciﬁc treaties or instruments).124 In its
inquiries and statements the IRA has also often referred to its own code of conduct
and procedures – the ‘Green Book’ – as the normative point of reference.125 For
example, in one case the IRA apologized because a killing was not authorized by the
organization’s leadership, in violation of the IRA’s internal regulations.126 In
another case, the IRA stated that when one of its members was court-martialled
and sentenced to death no appeal was lodged – in violation of its code of conduct,
and thus ‘the IRA accepts that proper procedure was not adhered to in relation to
the process of appeal’.127 A senior ex-combatant who discussed these issues with the
author said that the inquiries examine, among other things, ‘what the IRA should
have done in accordance with its own policies’.128
The reference to its own code probably allowed the IRA leadership to offer
apologies more readily, as it is premised on treating the organization itself as a
legitimate entity, and retaining the authority and status of its own procedures. While
violation of state law is part of an armed group’s raison d’être, and international
norms – norms created by states – are also often dismissed by armed groups, it is
much more difﬁcult for an organization to justify violations of its own rules.
But a reliance on internal procedures rather than human rights norms
naturally also has negative effects. In all the cases described here, the IRA has
apologized only for what it has essentially deemed to be ‘excesses’: for the secret
burial of individuals (but not for their killing), and for the accidental killings of
passers-by or people wrongly accused as informers (but not for the organization’s
123 See e.g. A.-M. La Rosa and C. Wuerzner, above note 4, p. 333.
124 See e.g. African National Congress National Executive Committee’s Response to the Motsuenyane
Commission’s Report, 29 August 1993.
125 Unlike some recent codes of conduct that include explicit references to IHL or human rights, the IRA’s
code, often referred to as the ‘Green Book’, has no such references. It does contain a rudimentary
procedural system of court martial for investigations and punishments of members. Though theoretically
conﬁdential, the Green Book was, for example, published in an annex in Martin Dillon, The Dirty War,
Hutchinson, London, 1990.
126 ‘IRA apology’, 5 April 2007, above note 112.
127 ‘IRA statement’, 25 September 2003, above note 110.
128 Interview with ex-combatant, Belfast, 31 August 2010.
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targeting policy as such). By referring only to ‘mistaken’ killings of individuals who
turned out to be wrongly accused of being informers, the IRA has at least implicitly
reiterated the legitimacy of its ‘accurate’ killings of real informers. However, while
the organization’s authority to court-martial and execute informers was in line with
its internal procedures, it has been argued that it was unlawful by international legal
standards.129 Finally, a related point is that, in the context of broader reconciliation
and conﬂict-transformation processes, the notion that the families of those wrongly
accused as being informers can now –with their loved ones ‘cleared’ by the IRA
investigations – reconcile with their communities, leaves the families of those not
cleared in a precarious position, their social ostracism at least implicitly reinforced.
Conclusions: armed groups as post-conﬂict actors
This article has demonstrated that, at least in some contexts, victims of abuses direct
their demands for symbolic reparations and truth at armed groups, not states; and
that, in some circumstances, these non-state groups have the capacity and
willingness to provide some measures of remedy to those victims. It is reasonable
to assume that such cases can go beyond Northern Ireland and South Africa, and the
ad hoc experiences of the ANC and the IRA in setting inquiries should become
more common if the needs of victims are to be met. To some degree these are
uncharted waters. But the logic is clear: if armed groups can commit state-like
abuses, based on their state-like characteristics, then they should be pressed to
provide state-like reparations.130 The approach suggested in this article involves
‘taking armed groups seriously’,131 not just as perpetrators of abuses and passive
objects of sanctions but also as active duty-holders and actors who can provide
measures of redress to victims of their past abuses.
An important implication of the analysis presented above is the need to
appreciate that some armed groups can remain a signiﬁcant factor in a transitional
or post-conﬂict phase, even when direct violence subsides. Indeed, this observation
is a premise of the wider call to explore the question of truth and symbolic
reparations from armed groups, since it is almost inevitable that the potential to
achieve truth and symbolic reparations would be signiﬁcantly higher during
transitions out of violence than at the height of conﬂict.
It must be emphasized again that this observation will not be applicable to
all armed groups. In many cases it will remain unfeasible to discuss any form of
reparation from armed groups. The LTTE in Sri Lanka, for instance, is a case in
point: in the aftermath of the conﬂict the group was simply eliminated as an
entity, and no military or political structures with direct or indirect afﬁliation with
129 See contemporary condemnation of informer killings by the IRA in Human Rights Watch, Northern
Ireland: Human Rights Abuses by all Sides, 1993, and Amnesty International, Political Killings in Northern
Ireland, 1994.
130 A similar and perhaps even stronger case can be made in relation to de facto states or ‘state-like entities’,
such as South Ossetia or Somaliland.
131 M. Sassòli, above note 3.
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it have remained. In such circumstances it makes little sense to demand reparations
from the LTTE. However, this scenario of the complete military and political defeat
of an armed group is not universal, and more complex scenarios, such as in
Northern Ireland, in which armed groups neither take power in a country nor are
completely eliminated, also exist. While it is beyond the remit of this article to
recommend speciﬁc potential cases for advocacy for reparation from armed groups,
it is clear that the structural circumstances that made it feasible in relation to the
ANC and the IRA are not in any way unique to Northern Ireland and South Africa.
In this context, it is important to note that there appears to be a perception
in the literature that the inﬂuence of armed groups simply disappears at the end of
the conﬂict, as they either unequivocally take over power in a state or are completely
eliminated.132 However, the IRA’s case is one demonstration of the inadequacy of
such assumptions. It shows that the political and social authority of an armed group
may remain paramount in the communities that supported it even after the end of
direct violence. Though the IRA ceased its military operations while failing to
achieve its stated goal of Irish unity, it did not disappear and still carries authority
within republican communities in Northern Ireland. More than a decade after it
announced its ceaseﬁre, actions and statements by the IRA still have the potential to
affect the lives of many individuals and families. In the aftermath of violence, the
IRA was neither totally eliminated nor did it capture full power in the country, and,
although its military structures seem to have become dormant, it has remained an
inﬂuential non-state actor. This status meant that, although large-scale violence by
the IRA has ended, victims seeking redress and those advocating on their behalf still
had an address to appeal to.
These conditions can apply elsewhere as well. Many other armed groups
and their political afﬁliates may retain signiﬁcant inﬂuence on segments of the
society even after a conﬂict ends.133 As Beck notes, contrary to some media and
other accounts, armed groups do not come out of the blue as intruders, but are
embedded in pre-existing social structures and ties within communities.134 This also
means that armed groups do not simply disappear with the end of violence. As Beck
writes in relation to UNITA’s members and supporters in post-conﬂict Angola:
‘Their loyalty outlived the armed group itself.’135 This observation is also relevant to
Northern Ireland and other places. An appreciation of the fact that many armed
groups are not ephemeral phenomena, and that they exert inﬂuence in their
communities through social control and not just direct violence, would be an
important step towards developing adequate transitional justice tools to address
abuses by armed groups.
132 For example, Zegveld argued that ‘opposition groups which fail to achieve their goals typically disintegrate
and disappear after the conﬂict’: L. Zegveld, above note 4, p. 156; and see also J. Kleffner, above note 32,
p. 265.
133 This is also a result of the fact that many transitions out of internal, identity-based conﬂicts can be long,
complex, and non-linear. See Colm Campbell and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘The paradox of transition in
conﬂicted democracies’, in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 27, 2005, pp. 172–213.
134 Teresa Beck, ‘Staging society: sources of loyalty in the Angolan UNITA’, in Contemporary Security Policy,
Vol. 30, 2009, pp. 343–355.
135 Ibid., p. 344.
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